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a b s t r a c t
The Vienna Sales Convention (1980) follows in large measure the American Uniform Commercial Code:
Article 2 on Sales. Is this to imply that the Contracting States to the Vienna Sales Convention really prefer
American sales law? This paper answers this question in the negative, and argues instead that the United
States’ economic leverage with other countries is the key factor influencing developments pertaining to
private law on a global level.
We explain why it may be useful to harmonize rules of private law on a global level and which rules
should be chosen for a uniform law. We show that the choice between two legal arrangements may lead toEconomic interdependencies
Game theory
a coordination problem. Next we argue that the coordination problem is solved in favor of the jurisdiction
whose economy is less dependent upon the economies of other jurisdictions than the other way around.






































The unification and harmonization2 of private law on a global
evel is a theme that receives increasing attention from legal schol-
rs. For example, in 2002, the International Institute for the Unifi-
ation of Private Law (UNIDROIT) held a congress on “Worldwide
armonisation of Private Law and Regional Economic Integration”.3
t is the aim of this paper to offer an economic perspective on
he theme. Comparative legal scholars have hitherto neglected
o include information on ‘economic interdependencies’ between
eparate jurisdictions into their studies of the globalization of pri-
ate law. This is rather unfortunate because comparative studies of
aw, welcome as they are, for the most part only uncover similarities
nd discrepancies in the private law of separate jurisdictions.
By combining information on economic interdependencies
etween separate jurisdictions with the fruits of comparative legal
cholarship in the field of private law we obtain new insights into
he question why it may be useful to harmonize rules of private
aw on a global level and the question which rules should be cho-
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: P.Herings@algec.unimaas.nl (P. Jean-Jacques Herings).
1 The author would like to thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
esearch (NWO) for financial support.
2 The term ‘harmonization’ will be used throughout the paper to encompass all
orms of approximation of laws, including unification.
3 The interested reader might refer to the Acts of the Congress that appeared in
he Spring 2003 issue of the Uniform Law Review, with contributions by Basedow,
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en for a uniform law. This is for two reasons. Comparative legal
esearch cannot provide a conclusive answer to the question of
hether to harmonize (parts of) private law on a global level. Nor
an comparative legal research provide a conclusive answer to the
uestion of which legal rules to include into uniform private laws. To
nswer both questions, complementary information on economic
nterdependencies between separate jurisdictions is indispensable.
The point is that the extent to which private law harmonization
an stimulate inter-jurisdictional economic activity might influ-
nce the extent to which separate jurisdictions are willing to
armonize their domestically defined private law. When harmo-
ization of a particular branch of private law is unlikely to stimulate
nter-jurisdictional economic activity, the willingness of separate
urisdictions to unify this branch of private law might be lim-
ted.
Furthermore, upon a decision to harmonize a particular branch
f private law, separate jurisdictions still have to ponder over
he issue of which legal rules to include into the uniform private
aw. Here, information on economic interdependencies between
eparate jurisdictions is indispensable once again. Although a juris-
iction might prefer its own legal rules to any other legal rules, a
urisdiction might nonetheless have an interest in placing the legal
ules of another jurisdiction into uniform private laws rather than
ny other legal rules. For, in so doing, this jurisdiction might boost
ts own economic growth by stimulating economic activity with the
ther jurisdiction. We will argue that the legal arrangements of the
urisdiction whose economy is less dependent upon the economies
f the other jurisdictions than the other way around are the ones
ost likely to be included into the uniform private law. To keep the




























































A two-player coordination game
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ength of the paper in check, the analysis will be confined to con-
ract law harmonization. It goes without saying that the analysis is
qually relevant for the harmonization of other areas of private law.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 aims to show that
ven if the private law of separate jurisdictions facilitates economic
ctivity as much as possible, the distributional consequences of pri-
ate law may create a coordination problem as to the question of
hich private law to apply to an inter-jurisdictional agreement.
ection 3 turns to a simple, static model in which to think about the
ssue of why a jurisdiction whose economy is less dependent upon
he economies of other jurisdictions than the other way around
ight be in a position to apply leverage over the production of uni-
orm private laws. Section 4 argues that a dynamic model will not
verturn our conclusions. Why the division into default rules and
andatory rules in contract law is not relevant to the analysis as
onducted in the previous sections is explained in Section 5. In the
ubsequent section our model serves as a basis for understanding
he drive for harmonization of sales law on a global level in the
wentieth century. The final section presents concluding remarks.
. Divergent private law
Consider an installment contract between a buyer and a seller.
he buyer is involved in the purchase of several items in sequence
uring some time interval. The buyer makes payments during
he same time interval. Typically the total value of the purchases
xceeds the aggregate payment for some time, i.e. some items have
een delivered but not yet been paid for.
In case the buyer defaults, the seller will seek repossession of
he items sold. Now there are two alternative legal arrangements
oncerning repossession. In the first arrangement, the seller has a
laim against all items with an obligation to return the payments
eceived, whereas in the second arrangement the seller may only
epossess the items which have not yet been paid for. Conditional on
igning the installment contract, the former arrangement is seller-
iased and the latter buyer-biased. It is also conceivable that a seller
ould only be willing to offer the installment contract under the
roviso that all items can be repossessed in case of default. In that
ase both the seller and the buyer would prefer this legal solu-
ion to the alternative one. A risk-averse buyer on the other hand,
ight only be willing to accept the installment contract under the
rrangement where only unpaid items can be repossessed.
The important point is the following. Even if both legal arrange-
ents are efficient from an ex ante point of view, in the sense
hat they create the same expected surplus, the way this surplus
s divided between the buyer and the seller is typically not the
ame. Both buyers and sellers are usually not indifferent between
he case where all items are repossessed and payments received
re returned and the case where only unpaid items are repossessed.
he two legal solutions have therefore different distributional con-
equences. There are many other examples where distinct legal
olutions are feasible, depending on for instance the legal provi-
ions concerning transfer of property, liability for breach, remedies
or breach, and burden of proof, with some parties preferring the
ne solution, and others the alternative.
The fact that private law has distributional consequences has
een noted before in the literature (see, e.g. Baird, Gertner, &
icker, 1994, p. 219; Cooter & Ulen, 2003, p. 260; Shavell, 2004, pp.
52–654). Thus, different private laws that are efficient, i.e. max-
mize the expected potential gains to be reaped from economic
ctivity, can have different distributional consequences. Through-
ut the paper it is assumed that separate jurisdictions do not
andomize their choice of private law. That is to say, differences
n the private law of separate jurisdictions are to be explained
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nt preferences regarding the way in which private law ought to
ffect the distribution of potential gains from economic activity. It
ollows that, to understand private law harmonization, an investi-
ation of whether separate jurisdictions, constrained by economic
ivalry, will succeed in providing private law that facilitates eco-
omic activity as much as possible does not suffice. The latter issue
as received considerable scholarly attention (see, e.g. La Porta,
ópez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches, & Shleifer, 2004; Mahoney, 2001;
agner, 1998 and references therein; Mattei, 1994).
In the case of inter-jurisdictional economic activity, there is a fur-
her element that contributes to the division of the surplus. A party
nvolved in an inter-jurisdictional trade is better informed about its
wn private law than about the private law of the other jurisdic-
ion. Each party would therefore prefer to apply the legal rules of
ts own jurisdiction over the legal rules of the other jurisdiction. A
arty incurs an additional transaction cost when the private law of
he other jurisdiction is being used.
The issue of which private law to apply to an inter-jurisdictional
ale of goods is captured by the two-player coordination game
f Table 1. The two parties to the sale are labeled players A and
. Player A is the seller and belongs to jurisdiction Y. Player B is
he buyer and belongs to jurisdiction Z. Jurisdiction Y has buyer-
iased private law and jurisdiction Z has seller-biased private law.
he monetary value to the seller of using seller-biased private
aw is $1000, the same as the monetary value to the buyer of
sing buyer-biased private law. Player A has a reservation price
f $500 under seller-biased private law, and $1500 under buyer-
iased private law. Player B’s willingness to pay is $3500 under
eller-biased private law and $4500 under buyer-biased private
aw. Moreover, when using the private law of the other jurisdiction,
player incurs a transaction cost of $500. The contracting price
quals $2500.
For simplicity, assume that each party has a choice of only two
trategies, ‘application of private law of jurisdiction Y’ and ‘appli-
ation of private law of jurisdiction Z’, labeled y and z respectively.
he numbers in the table represent the assumed payoffs, that is,
he gains from economic activity, received by each player for each
ombination of strategies that could be chosen by the players. The
eft-hand number of a cell of this matrix is the payoff accruing to
layer A, the right-hand number that of player B.
The assumed payoffs reflect four things. First, the payoffs reflect
hat the sale of goods produces a total gain of $3000. Second, the
ayoffs indicate that with a contracting price of $2500, the total
ain of $3000 is not divided evenly amongst the players. This is
ecause the division of the $3000 surplus depends in part on the
pplicable substantive private law. Jurisdiction Y has buyer-biased
rivate law and jurisdiction Z has seller-biased private law. Third,
he payoffs reflect that using private law of the other jurisdiction,
oth players incur a transaction cost of $500. Then, application
f the private law of jurisdiction Z to the sale results in a pay-
ff of $1500 ($2500 − $500 − $500) to player A and a payoff of
1000 ($3500 − $2500) to player B. Conversely, application of the
rivate law of jurisdiction Y to the sale results in a payoff of
1500 ($4500 − $2500 − $500) to player B and a payoff of $1000
$2500 − $1500) to player A. Fourth, in case the players fail to sub-
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re in disagreement as to material terms. This, in turn, means that
he players have not formed a valid contract and the resulting payoff
s $0 to each player.
The resulting game belongs to a class of games known as coordi-
ation games. The game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies,
ith action profiles (y, y) and (z, z) and with payoffs (1000, 1500)
nd (1500, 1000) respectively. This is to say that whilst parties
ight have a desire to enter into a mutually beneficial inter-
urisdictional agreement, they might fail in doing so because of
ncompatible views regarding the applicable private law.
Changes in the contracting price can solve the coordination
roblem caused by the distributional consequences of private law.
ut the informational asymmetry regarding the knowledge of unfa-
iliar private law, and the transaction costs involved in learning
he monetary consequences of unfamiliar private law might pre-
ent parties from making appropriate changes in the contracting
rice (see, e.g. Rubinstein, 1985).
. Uniform private law
A uniform private law solves the coordination game in which
arties engaged in inter-jurisdictional economic activity are
mbroiled. Supposing that private law of all jurisdictions facilitates
conomic activity as much as possible, as we do throughout the
aper, any argument that the private law of a given jurisdiction
ught to be placed into a uniform law because, as compared to
he private law of other jurisdictions, this particular private law
est facilitates economic activity is rendered meaningless. Then,
hich legal rules are likely to survive into the final draft of a suc-
essful uniform private law? In this respect, it is worth noting that
azear (1999) builds a model on the assumption that individu-
ls have incentives to learn other languages and cultures so as to
reate a larger pool of potential trading partners. Likewise, one
an apply the assumption that separate jurisdictions have incen-
ives to place the legal rules into uniform private laws of another
urisdiction so as to promote exports to and imports from this juris-
iction.
The effort of jurisdictions to compose a uniform law dealing with
particular branch of private law can again be captured by a game.
his game is shown in Table 2. The players in the game are juris-
ictions Y and Z. Regarding the composition of a uniform private
aw, each jurisdiction has a choice of two strategies, ‘placing legal
ules of jurisdiction Y into a uniform private law’ and ‘placing legal
ules of jurisdiction Z into a uniform private law’, labelled y and z
espectively.
The following assumptions are being made. It is assumed that
he prevailing legal solutions in jurisdictions Y and Z facilitate
inter-jurisdictional) economic activity as much as possible and are
ssumed to be in accordance with the preferences of their respec-
ive citizens. Absent uniform private laws, due to disputes over
hich private law to apply to inter-jurisdictional legal problems,
urisdictions Y and Z may fail to reap potential gains from inter-
urisdictional economic activity. Thus, once the two jurisdictions
ave agreed to adopt the legal rules of either jurisdiction into a
niform private law, this leads to benefits with a net present value
B to each of them. Note that this is true whichever way the uniform
able 2
osts and benefits of uniform private law
’s strategy Z’s strategy
y z
B, B − Cz 0, −Cz
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rivate law affects the distribution of potential gains from economic
ctivity.
On the other hand, in adopting legal rules of jurisdiction Y into
uniform private law, jurisdiction Z will have to bear two different
ypes of costs. The same holds true the other way around. That is,
he transaction costs of learning unfamiliar legal solutions. This has
een noted before in the literature (see e.g. Ott and Schäfer, 2004,
. 294).4 Also, the costs of applying less-preferred legal solutions.
hese costs arise because, as noted in Section 2, it is assumed in this
aper that separate jurisdictions have not randomized their choice
f private law. The law and economics literature on harmonization
f private law has thus far paid little attention to these latter costs.
e denote by Cy the net present value of the costs incurred by
urisdiction Y in adopting legal rules of jurisdiction Z into a uniform
rivate law. And by Cz we denote the net present value of the costs
ncurred by jurisdiction Z in adopting legal rules of jurisdiction Y
nto a uniform private law. The resulting game is the following.
Three basic game-theoretical structures can arise: in Case 1 each
urisdiction finds that the extra costs incurred in adopting the legal
ules of any other jurisdiction into a uniform private law exceed
he extra benefits obtained. Of course, in this instance, any plan
o unify this segment of private law can only be thwarted by the
urisdictions involved; in Case 2 the one jurisdiction finds that the
xtra costs incurred in adopting the legal rules of the other jurisdic-
ion into a uniform private law exceed the extra benefits obtained.
owever, the same does not hold the other way around. In this
nstance, to reduce legal impediments for inter-jurisdictional eco-
omic activity, this will force the one jurisdiction to agree with the
doption of the legal rules of the other jurisdiction into a uniform
rivate law; in Case 3 each jurisdiction finds that the extra costs
ncurred in adopting the legal rules of the other jurisdiction into a
niform private law do not exceed the extra benefits obtained. The
ame holds the other way around. This game-theoretical structure
orresponds with a coordination game. The game has two Nash
quilibria in pure strategies, (y, y) and (z, z). Nash equilibrium (y,
) leads to payoffs (B, B − Cz) and Nash equilibrium (z, z) to pay-
ffs (B − Cy, B). Accordingly, jurisdiction Y prefers the former Nash
quilibrium and jurisdiction Z the latter. The Nash equilibria are
ot Pareto ranked. In this case, negotiations on the adoption of a
niform private law are fraught with difficulties and it is far from
vident which jurisdiction will give in first.
If one would have to make a prediction on the outcome of the
ame in this case, it would be natural to use the concept of risk dom-
nance as introduced in Harsanyi and Selten (1988). The idea behind
he concept of risk dominance is to recognize that the existence of
trategic uncertainty, arising from the fact that there are two Nash
quilibria in pure strategies, creates an element of risk in jurisdic-
ions’ choices. This risk is present since the one jurisdiction does
ot know for sure what the other will do. According to Harsanyi and
elten (1988), jurisdiction Y’s risk situation is connected to the ratio
B + Cy)/(B − Cy). The numerator in this ratio corresponds to the loss
n payoffs to jurisdiction Y when moving from the upper-left cell to
he lower-left cell. That is, when jurisdiction Y does not play accord-
ng to Nash equilibrium (y, y) but deviates to z. Similarly, the denom-
nator in this ratio corresponds to the loss in payoffs to jurisdiction Y
hen moving from the lower-right cell to the upper-right cell. That
s, when jurisdiction Y does not play according to Nash equilibrium
z, z), but deviates to y. The higher the ratio, the more attractive it
s for jurisdiction Y to coordinate on Nash equilibrium (y, y).
4 The transaction costs of learning unfamiliar legal solutions are exogenous in our
odel. In their model of harmonization of legal regimes, Carbonara and Parisi (2007)
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Analogously, jurisdiction Z’s risk situation is connected to the
atio (B + Cz)/(B − Cz). The higher this ratio, the more attractive it
s for jurisdiction Z to coordinate on Nash equilibrium (z, z). If
B + Cy)/(B − Cy) exceeds (B + Cz)/(B − Cz), then jurisdiction Z’s rea-
on to abide by its own legal rules rather than the legal rules of
urisdiction Y is stronger than jurisdiction Y’s reason to abide by its
wn legal rules rather than by the legal rules of jurisdiction Z. After
ome manipulations, it can be verified that this is the case if and
nly if Cy > Cz.
The costs of learning the private law of jurisdiction Z are not
igher to a citizen of jurisdiction Y, because it is a relatively
low learner. Rather, information on economic interdependencies
etween separate jurisdictions offers a clue as to why Cy > Cz. Sup-
osing that the total value of economic activity of jurisdiction Y
s higher than the total value of economic activity of jurisdiction
, economic activity with jurisdiction Y will constitute a relatively
arger share of jurisdiction Z’s total economic activity than the other
ay around. As inter-jurisdictional economic activity is relatively
ore important to jurisdiction Z than to jurisdiction Y, jurisdiction
will face lower switching costs than jurisdiction Y. It is therefore
hat we argue that when the private law of all jurisdictions facil-
tates economic activity as much as possible, the jurisdiction the
conomy of which is relatively less dependent upon the economies
f other jurisdictions than vice versa will see its own legal rules
ntroduced into uniform private laws, leading to the first best out-
ome from this jurisdiction’s perspective.
. Dynamic perspective
Thus far, the analysis has been completely static. The point that
evelopments in private law should be studied from a dynamic per-
pective is well-taken. In this case the situation should be modeled
s an infinite-horizon multi-stage game. In each period jurisdic-
ions choose which legal rules to adopt into uniform private laws.
t the end of each period, jurisdictions observe the period’s action
rofile. The history at a period is determined by the sequence of
ctions in the previous periods. A pure strategy for a jurisdiction
n game-theoretic terms is simply a contingent plan of adoption of
egal rules into uniform private laws for each possible history.
The simplest case would be as follows. Whenever jurisdictions
and Z agree on adopting the legal rules of either jurisdiction into
niform private laws, this would lead to instantaneous benefits $B
o each of them. Otherwise, benefits are 0. The costs of switch-
ng from any set of legal rules to a different set of legal rules are
ssumed to be Cy for jurisdiction Y and Cz for jurisdiction Z. Then,
nstantaneous payoffs in the first period are as indicated in Table 2.
nstantaneous payoffs would coincide with those in Table 2 in any
eriod where the legal solutions chosen by the jurisdictions coin-
ide with those in the first period. Instantaneous payoffs in a period
here in the previous period jurisdictions have coordinated on the
riginal legal rules of jurisdiction Y are depicted in Table 3.
A similarly looking table applies to those periods where jurisdic-ions have coordinated on the original legal rules of jurisdiction Z
n the period before. The instantaneous payoffs in a period where in
he previous period jurisdiction Y has chosen the original legal rules
f jurisdiction Z and jurisdiction Z the original legal rules of jurisdic-
able 3
osts and benefits of uniform private law
’s strategy Z’s strategy
y z
B, B 0, −Cz
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ion Y are similar to those in Table 2. Total payoffs are determined
s the discounted sum of instantaneous payoffs.
It can be shown that a dynamic analysis of the situation at hand
oes not change the conclusions reached in our static analysis in
he following sense. Not switching after any history is a dynamic
ash equilibrium in Case 1. Then, no harmonization of private law
ill ever take place. In Case 2, the following pair of strategies con-
titutes a dynamic Nash equilibrium. The jurisdiction that is not
ble to recover costs involved in a change does never switch. The
ther jurisdiction switches and adopts private law of the high costs
urisdiction. It does not switch anymore once harmonization of
rivate law has taken place. As before, this forces the low costs
urisdiction to adopt the legal rules of the other jurisdiction imme-
iately. When both jurisdictions would recover the costs suffered in
dopting the other jurisdiction’s legal rules into a uniform private
aw, Case 3, both the situation where both jurisdictions coordinate
n the legal rules of jurisdiction Y and the situation where both
urisdictions coordinate on the legal rules of jurisdiction Z can be
ustained as Nash equilibria. In the former case, Nash equilibrium
trategies would be as follows. Jurisdictions Y and Z both do not
witch whenever harmonization of private law has taken place, and
hoose y otherwise. In the latter case, Nash equilibrium strategies
ould be such that jurisdictions Y and Z both do not switch when-
ver harmonization of private law has taken place, and choose z
therwise. As before, the Nash equilibria are not Pareto ranked and
egotiations on the adoption of a uniform private law are fraught
ith difficulties.
. Default rules and mandatory rules
Private law can be divided into two kinds of rules: default rules
nd mandatory rules.5 Whereas parties can contract around default
ules, mandatory rules are enforced, even if the parties to a contract
ttempt to override or modify them. The subdivision is not relevant
o our analysis because mandatory rules as well as default rules
ave distributional consequences. This calls for a brief explanation.
efault rules allow for parties to provide the terms of an agree-
ent by submitting their own (standard) forms. But, like default
ules, standard forms affect the way potential gains from economic
ctivity are divided. Von Mehren (1990, p. 267) puts it thus: ‘(. . .)
he parties’ posture in “battle-of-the-forms” cases; they want a con-
ract but, with respect to certain issues of importance, each wishes
o contract on the terms he proposed.’ The resulting “battle of the
orms” can be captured by a two-player coordination game simi-
ar to the one presented in Table 1. To resolve battles of the forms,
ourts draw on default rules, amongst other sources. It goes with-
ut saying that at least one contracting party will judge the default
ules that govern the unresolved battle of the forms unfavorably as
ompared to its own standard form.
On the other hand, upon enactment of a uniform private law,
he increase in inter-jurisdictional economic activity of the juris-
ictions involved is in part dependent on the branch of private law
nder consideration. For example, movements for harmonization
f family law will perhaps draw little support from separate juris-
ictions, not so much because of the distributional consequences
f domestically defined family law, but because of the relatively
imited number of inter-jurisdictional family disputes. In con-
rast, in spite of the potentially large distributional consequences
f, for example, domestically defined commercial law, initiatives
o unify this field may nonetheless resonate well with separate
urisdictions. The total value of inter-jurisdictional commercial
5 Default rules are sometimes called suppletive rules or background rules and












































































































production of the CISG (Vienna, 1980) indicates that a link can be
identified between, on the one hand, economic interdependencies
between separate jurisdictions and, on the other, developments in60 P. Jean-Jacques Herings, A.J. Kanning / Internatio
ransactions may fuel calls for unity. At any rate, the recognition that
armonization of both mandatory rules and default rules in con-
ract law leads to coordination problems provides a sober antidote
o the argument that harmonization of default rules (e.g. commer-
ial law) poses less of a challenge than harmonization of mandatory
ules (e.g. family law). Much has been made of this argument in the
egal literature (see, e.g. Ogus, 1999, pp. 410–412; Garoupa & Ogus,
006, pp. 341–342). Nevertheless, incompatible views of separate
urisdictions regarding the way in which (default) private law rules
ught to affect the distribution of potential gains from economic
ctivity can form an insurmountable obstacle to the production of
niform private laws. That separate jurisdictions might actually fail
n composing a successful uniform law dealing with cross-border
ommercial transactions is evidenced in the next section.
. An illustration
As can be gathered from the preceding sections, the emergence
f a global private law cannot be understood through examining
he fruits of comparative legal scholarship alone. Information on
conomic interdependencies between separate jurisdictions needs
o be infused in the investigation, too. An example serves to illus-
rate this point. All EU Member States but Portugal, Ireland and
reat Britain have endorsed the United Nations Convention on Con-
racts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (Vienna, 1980). And
umerous other countries across the globe, including the United
tates, have become Contracting States.6
Various commentators have noted that the drafting process of
he successful CISG (Vienna, 1980) was in no small part influenced
y the United States (US) (see, e.g. Landau, 1984, p. 35). And have
lso noted that the US had hardly – if at all – influenced the draft-
ng process of the abortive Uniform Law on the International Sale
f Goods (ULIS) (The Hague, 1964) and the Uniform Law on the For-
ation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULFIS) (The
ague, 1964) (see, e.g. Honnold, 1979, p. 225). Unsurprisingly, then,
hat the US had declined to endorse the ULIS (The Hague, 1964) and
he ULFIS (The Hague, 1964).
But does a country’s choice for the CISG (Vienna, 1980) auto-
atically imply that this country prefers the sales law as embodied
n the CISG (Vienna, 1980) to any other sales law? If only because
he formal sphere of application of the CISG (Vienna, 1980) is, in
rinciple, limited to the international, that is, cross-border, sale of
oods, the answer to this question is not self-evident. Indeed, to
imit the formal sphere of application of the CISG (Vienna, 1980)
o the international sale of goods is to allow contracting states to
pply different sales law to the sale of goods performed within their
wn confines.
In view of the analysis as conducted in Section 3, this paper
olds that even though countries might really have preferred their
wn sales law, they might still have had an interest in implement-
ng the CISG (Vienna, 1980). This is for the following reason. After
he Second World War, the US had decisively dethroned Britain as
he largest trading partner of the world. Now, given the relative
conomic dependence of other countries upon the US, lifting legal
arriers to international economic activity, although important to
ll countries, became relatively less important to the US than to
ther countries. This then gave the US increased leverage to press
or adoption of ‘American’ sales law into the CISG (Vienna, 1980).
n the other hand, had Western Europe, in particular, in defiance of
merican disinterest in the whole venture, succeeded in unifying
6 For a complete list of the Contracting States to the CISG (Vienna, 1980) the
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ts nationally defined sales laws by means of the ULIS (The Hague,
964) and the ULFIS (The Hague, 1964), this would have put coun-
ries in this corner of the globe under less strain to enact the CISG
Vienna, 1980). Lacking a unified stand in matters of commercial
aw, Western Europe had weakened its position to fend off pressure
rom the US to use the American Uniform Commercial Code – Arti-
le 2 on Sales as principal guideline for the CISG (Vienna, 1980). As
o the question of why Britain, in particular, has, thus far, declined
nactment of the CISG (Vienna, 1980), it pays to notice that the City
f London has remained a centre for the resolution of international
ommercial disputes to this very day. British lawyers clearly have a
omparative advantage if British law is applied instead of the CISG.
ritain’s dominant share in world trade until the Second World War
ust have helped London become a centre for the resolution of
nternational commercial disputes.
Two lessons can be learned from the harmonization of sales
aw on a global level for future harmonization of other segments
f private law on a global level. First of all, it must be empha-
ized that international sales law has been harmonized by means
f a convention. As adoption of the CISG (Vienna, 1980) remained
he prerogative of national governments, the movement for global
armonization of sales law did not in any way infringe on the
egal sovereignty of the jurisdictions involved. Accordingly, with-
ut intervention by supranational institutions, the CISG (Vienna,
980) brought unity in an area of private law where it was, at least
ccording to the Contracting States, really needed. This approach
ooks equally promising for the harmonization of other areas of
rivate law on a global level.
As an aside, mention should be made of the ‘Joint Network on
uropean Private Law’ established as of 1 May 2005. This so-called
etwork of Excellence is part of the Sixth Framework Programme of
he European Commission. Its principal goal is to deliver a proposal
or the “Common Frame of Reference” for European contract law as
escribed in the Commission’s Action Plan on Contract Law (COM
2003] 68 final) and its follow-up Communication COM (2004)
51 final.7 The proposal will be presented in the form of princi-
les (“Common Principles of European Contract Law” = CoPECL),
ncluding definitions, general concepts and legal rules. In Annex I –
Description of Work” of the Contract between the European Com-
ission and the participants of the Network on European Private
aw it is stated that (p. 5): ‘(. . .) the CoPECL may inspire further
eflection on an optional new Community instrument.’ This idea
f the European Commission comes in for the following (critical)
uestion. Might EU Member States that are truly bent on estab-
ishing unity in their nationally defined private laws succeed in
chieving their goal by means of international conventions like the
ISG (Vienna, 1980)? If the number of Contracting States to the CISG
Vienna, 1980) is any guide, the answer is unequivocally yes. This,
n turn, means that the employment of Community instruments to
armonize areas of private law in the EU would violate the so-called
rinciple of subsidiarity, as enshrined in Article 5 of the European
nion Treaty.8
The second lesson to be learned is that the US’ leverage over thehe field of private law. The ensuing elaboration purports to offer
7 Information on the European Commission’s Action Plan on a More Coher-
nt Contract Law can be obtained from the following website: http://europa.eu.
nt/comm/consumers/.
8 An investigation of the allocation of competence between the EU Member States
nd the European Commission has also been conducted in the field of competition
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n indication of how economic interdependencies between sepa-
ate jurisdictions might affect processes of unifying domestically
efined private law. Deep legal rifts are traditionally said to be
ound in the private law of England and the national private law on
he European continent. Kinship among the national private law on
he European continent is thought to be relatively stronger. Hence,
omparative legal research supports the view that any project
imed at unifying (parts of) the private law of the EU Member States
ill face the challenge of assimilating the private law of England
ith the national private law of continental Europe (see, e.g. Reid
Zimmermann, 2000; Zimmermann, Reid, & Visser, 2005).
In order to evaluate this view, it is important to note, for one
hing, that disparities in national private law within the EU may
ometimes be at least as sharp as any between the US and the
embers of the EU themselves. Insofar as adoption of a uniform
rivate law is concerned, it may, thus, make little difference to EU
ember States whether they adopt a uniform law largely based
n the private law of another Member State, or, for that matter,
dopt a uniform law largely based on American private law. For
nother, taking economic interdependencies between jurisdictions
nto account, to end any harmonization project within the EU suc-
essfully, Franco-German approval ought perhaps to be regarded as
ssential. However, the EU and the US are each other’s most impor-
ant source and destination for trade and capital flows. Upon this
bservation, adoption of a uniform private law largely inspired by
merican examples would be to strike two birds with one blow for
U Member States. Impediments to inter-jurisdictional economic
ctivity are swept away within the EU and, simultaneously, between
he Union and her most important economic partner the US. Espe-
ially when the EU turns out to be deeply divided about matters
f private law, her Member States look prone to submit to pressure
rom the US to place the legal rules it promotes into uniform private
aws.
. Concluding remarks
This paper shows that to explain campaigns for a more uni-
ed private law on a global level, comparative legal scholarship
s but an ingredient of a larger study that should also comprise an
nalysis of economic interdependencies between separate juris-
ictions. Unity in the private law of separate jurisdictions might
erhaps help to sweep away some of the many legal obstacles that
tand in the way of inter-jurisdictional economic activity. However,
ven when separate jurisdictions subscribe to the aim of unifying
branches of) domestically defined private law, they are unlikely to
ead from precisely the same play sheet. This is because separate
urisdictions might have genuinely different preferences regarding
lternative legal arrangements. We have argued that this opens the
ay for coordination problems to emerge between separate juris-
ictions about the issue of which legal rules to place into uniform
rivate laws. As to the question of which jurisdiction might be in a
osition to apply influence over the production of uniform private
aws, this paper held that economic interdependencies between
eparate jurisdictions provide an answer. A jurisdiction the econ-
my of which is relatively less dependent upon the economies of
ther jurisdictions than the other way around has an advantage
ver other jurisdictions. This advantage may result in the introduc-
ion of the legal rules of that jurisdiction into uniform private laws.
or, in doing so, other jurisdictions would most encourage their
wn economic activity. Then again, for all extra benefits from inter-
urisdictional economic activity created by uniform private laws,
ue to coordination problems, jurisdictions might nonetheless fail
o enact uniform private laws.
Furthermore, this paper sought to interpret empirical observa-
ions against the theoretical arguments as advanced. Comparative
v
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egal scholars have observed that the United States exercised pro-
ound influence over the drafting process of the successful United
ations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
CISG) (Vienna, 1980). Did American sales laws find their way into
he CISG (Vienna, 1980) because, as compared to other sales laws,
hey apparently best facilitated economic activity? Possibly so, but
his line of reasoning – if implicitly – rests on the premise that
ales law that facilitates economic activity as much as possible can
nly affect the distribution of potential gains from economic activ-
ty in a unique way. Instead, since sales law that facilitates economic
ctivity as much as possible need not have the same distributional
onsequences, the reason for America’s substantial influence over
he drafting process of the CISG (Vienna, 1980) is something sub-
ler. America’s economic clout after the Second World War must
ave increased the countries’ ability to influence the drafting pro-
ess of a projected uniform sales law. The point is that, given the
elative economic dependence of other countries upon the US,
he removal of legal roadblocks to international economic activ-
ty, although increasingly important to all countries, was relatively
ess important to the US than to other countries. Thus, to promote
xports to and imports from the United States, other countries had
n interest in composing a uniform sales law along American lines.
n the other hand, as countries were perfectly allowed to decline
nactment of the CISG (Vienna, 1980), the trend towards global har-
onization of sales law did not in any way compromise the legal
overeignty of the countries involved. Regarding the harmoniza-
ion of other areas of private law, this leads to the following policy
mplication: when international conventions in the field of private
aw fail to garner widespread support, any offer by supranational
nstitutions to come to the rescue should be treated with the utmost
kepticism.
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